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Abstract
We document empirically that rich countries are more politically
cohesive than poorer countries. In order to explain this regularity, we
provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of
a fully functioning market economy. Without market exchange, the
welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent.
As a result, political negotiations, echoing the preferences of the cit-
izens of society, will be dog-eat-dog in nature. Whoever has greater
bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that enhance the
productivity of his supporters at the expense of other groups in soci-
ety. If the gains from specialization become suﬃciently large, however,
a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non-cohesive
under self-suﬃciency, the political decision making process becomes
cohesive in the market economy, as the welfare of individuals will be
mutually interdependent due to the exchange of goods. We refer to
this latter state as “capitalist cohesion”.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that richer economies tend to be more politically stable
than their less aﬄuent counterparts. Indeed, almost every indicator of po-
litical turmoil, ranging from political protests against policies enacted by
the current regime to the dramatic case of revolutions, exhibits a negative
correlation with prosperity. This fact is often explained by e.g. the degree of
fractionalization of society (measured in terms of income inequality, ethnic-
ity, language or perhaps religious beliefs), and is suggested as one important
reason for the dismal growth performance of Africa in particular (Easterly
and Levine, 1997). However, a relative lack of political stability is not unique
to modern day poor nations. Indeed, we argue below that a link between
prosperity and political stability can also be found in the historical record
of today’s industrialized societies.
It should be uncontroversial to assert that political instability reflects a
basic lack of political cohesion between opposing political sides. But that
only begs the question of why some countries are more politically cohesive
than others. The present paper develops a theory of how political cohesion
may arise endogenously during the process of development.
The central hypothesis advanced below is that the nature of the politi-
cal struggle between groups is critically aﬀected by the organization of the
economy; the paramount institution in this regard is the market institution
itself. That is, whether (the members of) rival political groups are exchang-
ing goods in a market or not. We demonstrate that once inter-group market
exchange is initiated, the nature of the political process changes and be-
comes more cohesive. We argue that the theory is capable of shedding light
on both the historical patterns and the observed cross-country correlation
between political cohesion and prosperity. At the more detailed level the
logic of the argument is as follows.
Consider a regime one may label “self-suﬃciency”. In this regime indi-
viduals are economically fully self-reliant in the sense that they produce the
goods they consume themselves. This regime might be thought to approxi-
mate a predominantly subsistence-oriented economy. In the absence of mar-
kets where goods are exchanged the welfare of individuals will be mutually
independent. As a result, any redistributive struggle between individuals
will be fierce; whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make
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decisions that enhance the productivity of his supporters at the expense of
other groups in society. In this sense the political process is non-cohesive.
Consider instead the polar opposite case: A fully developed market econ-
omy. In the market environment rival political groups will be specialized in
production of diﬀerent goods and trading with one another. In a histori-
cal setting one may think of the political rivalry between merchants (and
later manufacturers) on the one hand, and the landed elite (or farmers)
on the other, as an example of how rival groups may be identified by the
type of good produced.1 The key insight is that it will no longer be un-
ambigiously in the interest of any political group to make decisions that
enhance their own productivity at the expense of other groups in society.
The reason is that the market institution produces a price tag on curbing
the living standards and productivity of selected groups; higher prices on
the goods they are associated with the production of. As a result of mar-
ket integration, an alignment of interests emerges and the political process
becomes more cohesive because of it. Indeed, as demonstrated in the model
below, the allocation outcome from political interaction in a market scenario
becomes more eﬃcient (in the stylized model, Pareto optimal, and unani-
mously agreed upon). Hence, insofar as a transition to a market economy
occurs, political cohesion ensues, intuitively making political instabilty and
conflict much less likely. Moreover, output per capita rises due to the gains
from specialization and because of more eﬃcient political outcomes. We
refer to this state as that of “capitalist cohesion”.
In spite of its attractiveness, a transition from “self-suﬃciency” to a
market economy may not occur. As illustrated in the model below, whether
a transition occurs or not depends, among other things, on the gains from
specialization. If just one group stands to gain only little from trading,
yet is politically powerful in “autarky”, it may not wish to participate in
the market due to its ability to appropriate resources through the political
process. As a result a transition is not viable. Consequently, the process
of task-specific skill formation, which drives comparative advantages in the
model below, is key in fascilitating the emergence of political cohesion at a
deeper level. If the scope for learning - within diﬀerent tasks — is suﬃciently
1 In contemporary Africa opposing political sides are often defined along ethnic lines.
But in some cases diﬀerent ethnic groups are in fact also distinguishable by which goods
they tend to be associated with the production of. An example is presented in Easterly
(2002, Ch. 13) involving the cocoa producing Ashanti in Ghana.
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large the gains from specialization will rise over time and sooner or later
make a transition likely. Still, during the delay the economy as a whole is
caught in what is eﬀectively a poverty trap.
As should be clear, this theory is broadly consistent with the contem-
porary cross-country correlation between income and political cohesion that
we document below. The theory suggests, in addition, that causality runs in
either direction. On the one hand, economic progress and domestic market
exhange enables a transition into a cohesive political climate. On the other
hand, a more cohesive political environment enables more eﬃcient political
outcomes, which spurs productivity.
While the model we develop does not focus on political instability per
se, it should be clear that our theory is related to research that studies
the orgin of such instability. Consider, for instance, the hypothesis that
ethnic divisions are key in understanding political instability (e.g. East-
erly and Levine, 1997; Annett, 2001). At the fundamental level the notion
that ethnicity matters for political instability, and the present hypothesis
are perfectly reconcilable; a lack of (willingness to) exchange goods could
be grounded in ethnic hatred. Ethnically anchored political disagreements
may therefore be perpetuated by a lack of economic interaction of individual
groups. At the same time, the two “mechanisms” may be at work simulta-
neously, and independently of one another.
Hence, insofar as political instability is a symptom of a lack of political
cohesion our theory contributes with a further understanding of why poorer
economies tend to be more politically unstable, and why this state of aﬀairs
may come at a cost of lower living standards. From this perspective the
present paper is related to the literature which directly examines the sources
of political instability (e.g. Olson, 1963, Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Easterly
and Levine, 1997) or civil conflict (Collier and Hoeﬄer, 2004; Miguel et al.,
2004; Olsson, 2007). Similarly related is a string of contributions which
provides theory and evidence on the consequences of political instability
for prosperity or institutional change (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000;
Alesina et al., 1996; Barro, 1991).2
2A major implication of the present paper is that cohesion arises gradually during
development. From this perspective the work of Galor et al (2009) and Galor and Moav
(2006) are related. In these works, however, “consensus” over political choices emerges
because of capital-skill complementarity which makes rival political groups interdependent
(i.e., workers and capitalists). The present paper contains a diﬀerent consensus creating
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The paper is also related to a (primarily political science) literature that
studies a phenomenon often referred to as “the liberal peace”, i.e. that
democratic and market-oriented countries usually do not fight with each
other.3 Mousseau (2003), for instance, proposes that countries where people
are engaged in contractual exchange of goods and services gradually tend
to develop liberal norms and values, which in turn strengthen the market
economy. On the basis of a statistical analysis of interstate wars 1950-92,
Gartzke (2007) even claims that the positive eﬀect of democracy on peace
disappears when a variable for financial openness is included. According to
Gartzke (2007), we should therefore refer to the link between prosperity and
political cohesion as “the capitalist peace”. Our paper adds to this literature
by modelling the process of how an internal market economy arises, which
is arguably a necessary requisite for subsequent international trade.4
The paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we present historical
and cross-country evidence on the relationship between political cohesion
and economic development. In section 3, develops the model and section 4
discusses the implications of the model. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Motivating Evidence
The central hypothesis of the present paper is that political cohesion may
emerge endogenously during development. In this section we begin by docu-
menting that, as a matter of cross-country correlations, richer countries are
on average charactarized by a greater degree of political cohesion. It should
be stressed at the outset that we make no attempt to establish causality.
Instead we view the correlation as an interesting stylized fact, which needs
to be accounted for. The theory developed below is capable of doing just
that.
In addition to the cross country exercises, we discuss historical evidence
which suggest that the industrious revolution, the gradual commercialisa-
tion of economic activity, ushered the beginning of a more politically stable
mechanism: the market mechanism itself.
3For a literature overview and some new evidence, see Mousseau et al (2003).
4Skaperdas and Syranopoulos (2001) provides a formal statement of this idea. In their
analysis, trade between nations does not necessarily lead to peace. Furthermore, the
price of the traded good is assumed to be exogenous, whereas endogenous terms of trade
(between rival groups or regions) is a key part of our theory.
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environment in Europe in general, and in the UK in particular. The histori-
cal record thus provides some suggestive reduced form evidence of the main
mechanism advocated below: as citizens’ increasingly rely on each other via
trade their welfare becomes intertwined prompting their political views to
converge. As observed in the Introduction, this kind of convergence of po-
litical views may well be an important reason why richer economies tend to
be more politically stable than poorer countries.
2.1 Cross-Country Data
A fully satisfactory measure of the extent of political cohesion is probably
impossible to construct in light of the huge number of dimensions over which
an individual can hold a “political view”. Hence, we will have to make do
with a proxy.
In contructing a measure of political cohesion we rely on survey data from
the World Value Survey (WVS). In the WVS respondents are confronted
with a one-to-ten scale, and asked: “In political matters, people talk of “the
left” and “the right”. How would you place your views on this scale, generally
speaking?”. In order to capture political cohesion we first calculate the
percentage of the respondents that put themselves at the two extremes.
That is, the fraction of the respondents who answered either “one” or “ten”.
“Political cohesion” is then thought to be rising if the fraction of respondents
at the extremes shrink. Hence, the variable “political cohesion” is defined as
100-(fraction of respondents answering “one” or “ten”). In order to obtain
as large a country sample as possible we used the results from pooling WVS
from the period 1981-2000.5 This leaves us with a sample of 71 country
observations.
It should be recognized that the notion of “left” and “right” unques-
tionably diﬀers from one country to the next. For instance, a “right wing”
politician in Scandinavia is a completely diﬀerent sort of character than a
right wing politician in the US. At the same time it is clear that individuals
who answer “one” or “ten” are deliberately signalling extreme political views
in the context of their local political landscape. Hence, fewer “extremists”
seems to be a context independent measure of political “distance” between
the members of any given populous, or, of a greater degree of political cohe-
5The data can be obtained online at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
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sion. Accordingly, whereas the absolute (average) political view is diﬃcult
to compare across countries, we maintain that deviations from the (country
specific) “center” is a comparable measure of the extent of political cohe-
sion in a society. As a parsimonious measure of economic development we
employ (PPP) GDP per capita. As our political cohesion variable reflects
surveys from the period 1981-2000, we employ GDP per capita at roughly
the midtpoint: 1990.
Figure 1 here
Figure 1 shows the simple correlation between our measure of political
cohesion and GDP per capita. As is visually obvious, the two variables are
highly correlated. The amount of variation in the political cohesion variable
is noteworthy: in the poorest countries in the sample it is not uncommon
to find 30% or more of the population at the political extremes. By way of
contrast, in rich places like Germany, Austria and Norway, less than 10% of
the population feels that they are either “extreme leftish” or “extreme right
wing”. One may also observe three major outliers in the figure: Vietnam,
Tanzania and Pakistan. Whereas Vietnam and Tanzania are charactarized
by very low levels of cohesion, Pakistan is uncommonly cohesive for its
income level. In order to examine the robustness of the correlation between
cohesion and prosperity we resort to regression analysis.
As far as we are aware, no other study has examined the determinants
of political cohesion. Hence, we have no previous study on which to rely
in choosing appropriate additional controls. Consequently we have chiefly
selected variables that have been suggested as determinants of political in-
stability in previous studies (e.g., Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Annett, 2001):
Ethnic fractionalization; the urbanisation rate and primary schooling. In
addition we check robustness against the inclusion of population size, age
composition of the population and the unemployment rate. Finally, we in-
clude a full set of continent fixed eﬀects. As the WVSs are from the period
1981-2000 we measure the controls mid period, in 1990. All data on the con-
trols are from the World Development Indicators CD-rom. Table 1 reports
the results from standard OLS regressions of political cohesion on GDP per
capita and the above mentioned controls.
Table 1 here
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Column 1 shows the basic link between GDP per capita and political
cohesion; the former is able to motivate about 50% of the variation in the
latter. If we were to take the point estimate at face value it would suggest
that an increase in log GDP per capita of one percent increases cohesion
by about six percentage points. In practise of course, the correlation may
well reflect reverse causality and omitted variables. To check for the latter,
the next seven columns show how the partial correlation between GDP per
capita and cohesion is aﬀected by including additional controls. GDP per
capita retains its significance in all cases; only when we control for the age
composition of the population are we able to reject significance at the 5%
level, but not at 6%. In the final column we include all controls at once. In
spite of the rather small sample, GDP per capita is significant.
To check for outliers we did two things. First, we employed the Hadi
(1992) outlier detection procedure, which identifies (as expected, cf. Figure
1) Vietnam, Tanzania and Pakistan as outliers. In addition, Puerto Rico
is singled out. We subsequently re-ran the regressions above omitting these
four observations from the data set. The results (available upon request)
show that GDP per capita is significant at the one percent level of confidence
in all specifications.
Admittedly, we have no knowledge of whether these four observations
are conveying misleading information. From this perspective one may worry
about dropping them from the data set.
Hence, as a second check we ran outlier robust median (least absolute
deviation, LAD) regressions on the full data set (these results are also avail-
able upon request). Once again we find GDP per capita to be significant in
all specifications at the five percent level or better. In sum, GDP per capita
would seem to be a rather robust correlate with political cohesion.
Naturally, these results do not establish that GDP per capita increases
political cohesion; political cohesion may well be influencing GDP per capita.
Indeed, according to the proposed theory we would expect this to be the
case. In addition, the theory does not imply that GDP per capita matters
to cohesion per se; it is the process of specialization and the development
of market exchange which influence the political process. Still, as these
developments work to elevate living standards, we expect GDP per capita
to be a reasonable proxy. Nevertheless, to gain some additional motivation
for the advocated mechanism, linking GDP per capita and political cohesion,
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we next turn to the historical record.
2.2 The Historical Record
Consider England, the epicenter of the industrial revolution. As pointed out
by Clark (1996, p 568):“Between 1560 and 1770, England experienced nu-
merous periods of political turmoil, internal warfare, and important changes
of political regime”. Indeed, this period contains events such as the English
Civil War (1639-51), several planned coups and the “glorious revolution” of
1688. In fact, most of mainland Europe was characterized by a similar state
of aﬀairs during this period. De Vries (1976, p. 3) puts it succinctly:
“ ... the seventeenth century is marked by an unusual num-
ber of civil disturbances: aristocratic protests against the growth
of the bureaucratic state and peasant revolts against new taxes,
changed land tenure conditions, and food distribution measures
that oﬀended a sense of economic justice”.
When moving beyond the 17th century one continues to observe dis-
ruption on a fairly regular basis in England. 18th and early 19th century
England witnessed the Gordon Riots of 1780, the Luddith movement, the
1776 American Revolution, food riots and a considerable assortment of mi-
nor uprisings (Archer, 2000). Eventually, however, England did enter a
period of calmer political climate towards the end of the 19th century, and
continued on the path towards prosperity (Olson, 1963). But clearly the
historical record demonstrate that the political climate in England used to
be turbulent, with periods of political upheavals not unlike what is observed
in modern day less developed economies.
In the context of the historical record one may wonder whether a transi-
tion from “self-suﬃciency” to “market trade” can be said to have bearing on
what occurred in Europe in general, and England in particular, during the
last millennium. To be sure, there is no historical period where “autarky”
can be said to be an exact description of how the economy was organized. At
least as far back as the Dark Ages archeological evidence of formal market
places can be marshaled (Hodges, 1982, Ch. 9), and during the Medieval pe-
riod historical evidence can be brought to bear on how markets in England
expanded and contracted as a function of the time varying size of popula-
tion (Britnell, 1993). Still, there is no doubt the last millennium has seen a
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remarkable expansion of the role of the market in people’s everyday life. As
Seabright (2004, p. 42) puts it:
“Until around six hundred years ago in Europe, and until a
little more recently in North America, most families ate food they
had grown themselves. They were certainly not self-suﬃcient in
the strict sense since they relied on others for some things — metal
for agricultural tools for example. But changes in their links with
the outside world would rarely threaten their food supply. Today,
in the same countries, most families who were prevented from
exchanging with others would starve within a few weeks”.
From this perspective; if one thinks about the current organization of
the economy, where individuals to an extreme extent rely on each other (or
rather the market) for their survival, as a fully integrated market economy,
the simplification of describing the situation in Europe a millennium ago as
“autarky” may seem less unreasonable as a (perhaps crude) approximation.6
Turning to the crux of the theoretical argument; a reasonable case can be
made that market participation and the exchange of goods did accelerate in
the centuries preceding the industrial revolution, thus paving the way for a
more cohesive political climate. The intensification of market participation,
associated with a gradual reduction in the degree to which individuals were
self-suﬃcient with regards to agricultural goods is what De Vries (1994)
labels the “industrious revolution”. In particular he remarks that (p. 257):
“.. the industrious revolution, for which evidence can be
found from the mid-seventeenth century into the early nineteenth,
consisted of two transformations: the reduction in leisure time
... and the allocation of labor from goods and services for direct
consumption to marketed goods”.
Moreover, as for the other half of society — the city dwellers — Voth (1998)
provides evidence of a large increase in working hours between the eighteenth
6The notion of a clean “switch” from autarky to a full market economy is a similar
(over)simplification. Historically, the expansion of trade over increasing distances was
probably a gradual one (e.g. North, 1991). This gradual evolution covering periods of
partial specialization in the economy is not captured by the model. Providing a more
detailed description of the evolution of the market institution and its gradual eﬀects on
the nature of the political struggle is a topic for future research.
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and nineteenth century for Londoners. With less time to spare the urban
population would naturally have to become correspondingly more reliant on
(increasingly specialized) food producers in order to sustain themselves.7
Seen through the lenses of the theory advanced in the present paper; once
the “industrious revolution” is complete, resulting in an intensified exchange
of goods, the political climate should start to become more cooperative in
nature, as it arguably did in England starting sometime in the last half of
the nineteenth century.
3 The Model
Consider a growing economy in the process of development. Time is discrete,
 = 0 1 2 Imagine that at time  = 0, the initial population is distributed
randomly across some land area. Individuals live for two periods: youth and
adulthood. Their preferences are defined over two diﬀerent goods. The two
goods will be labelled “” and “”, respectively. To fix ideas one can think
of them as “agricultural” goods, and “manufactured” goods. The popula-
tion can be divided into two distinct groups according to their comparative
advantages in production of these goods. Henceforth “-people” and “-
people”. The origin of these diﬀerences are described below, but are related
to the process of transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next
and depends on geographical location. In every period, the groups interact
with the purpose of dividing a scarce resource between them.
The overall sequence of events in the model is the following:
1. The two groups choose what economic regime they prefer to be in:
Self-suﬃciency () or market economy (), i.e. whether they wish to
engage in trade with each other or not.
2. The groups divide up a common productive resource () between them
through political bargaining, conditional on the economic regime cho-
sen in the first stage.
3. The two groups decide how much to produce and consume (and po-
tentially trade), using the allocation of  determined in the second
stage.
7However, see Clark and Van der Werf (1998) for a sceptical assessment of the claim
that working hours expanded during this period.
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As usual, we assume rational and forward-looking individuals who can
perfectly assess the eﬀects of choices in each stage. The model is solved
through backward induction. We therefore start below by solving for the
production and consumption decisions in the third stage.
3.1 Preferences
During youth, individuals are brought up and acquire human capital. In
addition they share consumption with their parent. Individuals are econom-
ically active only during adulthood. At any given point in time, there exist
 adults living at “-locations”, while  adults inhabit “-locations”.
Accordingly  =  +  Assume that once individuals are settled in an
area they remain immobile. More precisely, individuals in -locations are
assumed not to attempt to move to-locations and vice-versa.8 For simplic-
ity, we will also assume that population levels remain constant throughout
the analysis.9
Individuals living at location  =  have the following utility function:
 =  () =   =  (1)
which depends on consumption of the two goods where exponents + = 1
indicates the relative utility of each good. The utility function satisfies the
usual assumptions of a positive but diminishing marginal utility of each
product. All individuals have 1 unit of time at their disposal for productive
activities during adulthood. In a regime where individuals are self-suﬃcient
they will split their time between production of the two goods. Accordingly,
individuals are subject to a time constraint
1 =  +  (2)
8Since location specific knowledge needs to be acquired when changing region, costs
of moving could be prohibitively high. In addition there would be the standard costs
associated with transport etc. These costs would not necessarily be uniform across, say,
-people, since the physical distance to a -region could vary from one person to the next.
As a result, even if there were an incentive to move, the area need not be “emptied”.
9The model can be generalized to allow fertility to be endogenous without implications
for the key results below. Specifically, suppose preferences are defined over the two final
goods and fertility, . Assume that time is allocated between production and fertility.
Then, since preferences are identical Cobb-Douglas across locations the rate of population
growth would be the same, and the relative level of population constant.
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where  represents time allocated to the production of good  at location

3.2 Production
The production technologies are
 =  (3)
 =  (4)
respectively.
 is to be thought of as the amount of a resource that can be used
in both tasks, at a given location. As will be discussed further below,
 +  =  where  is the fixed supply of the resource. Throughout
history, land has probably been the most important factor of production
and one which has also frequently been the object of distributive strug-
gles. Minerals and fuels are other examples of contestable resources. More
broadly, one might think of  as the productive resources that a govern-
ment controls such as contracts, concessions, protection, infrastructure, or
the like. Below, the allocation of the resource between individuals at the
two locations will be determined through political bargaining. Therefore,
 associates the distributive struggle between groups with their individ-
ual living conditions, and therefore links the political struggle to aggregate
productivity in a simple way.
The other factors of production are human capital (skills)  and time
. We assume that output increases linearly with skills whereas there is
diminishing returns to working time since the output elasticities are   
1.
A key assumption is that people in the two regions or locations have a
comparative advantage in producing one of the two goods. More specifically,
we assume that
 =    =  (5)
In other words, at -locations, the marginal productivity of an additional
working hour is larger in the -activity than in the -activity (  ),
and conversely at -locations (  ). For simplicity, we assume that
there is a symmetry in these productivity diﬀerences.
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In order to ensure the emergence of comparative advantages in produc-
tion, we assume that output elasticities and the Cobb-Douglas utility para-
meters are defined by the following inequality:

 

 

 (6)
3.3 Human capital accumulation
Sector specific skills at the two locations  accumulate through a process
of learning-by-doing in accordance with:
+1 =  for  = ;  = ; 0 given. (7)
The skills of the next generation specific to production of good  at loca-
tion  depend on two factors: The knowledge of the parent,  the general
technological stage of development in society at large, , and the working
time in that sector,  In this way, the intergenerational transmission of
skills is a kind of positive externality from ordinary production.  ∈ (0 1)
means that there is diminishing returns to the human capital of the old
generation in the learning process.
The relative level of skills in producing the two goods, at location , is
given by
+1
+1 =
µ 

¶µ 

¶
 (8)
In a steady-state where +1+1 =  = ˜˜, we will
have that
˜
˜ =
µ ∗
∗
¶ 1
1−  (9)
where ∗ is the equilibrium time allocation to the specific production ac-
tivity, which will be determined next.
3.4 Optimization under self-suﬃciency
As discussed above, there are two basic regimes for organizing production
in the aggregate economy: Self-suﬃciency in which people at both locations
produce both goods in isolation from each other, and a market economy
when trade between locations takes place and production is specialized.
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Under self-suﬃciency, the utility maximization problem is to find, for
both regions  = ,
∗ = argmax
n³
 (1− )
´ ¡¢o
The straightforward solutions for the time allocation problem are
∗ =  +   
∗ =

 +   for  = 
implying an indirect utility under self-suﬃciency (with an index S) of
  ≡ Ω for  =  (10)
where Ω = ()()(+)+ .
The equilibrium levels of time allocation can now be used in order to
solve for the steady-state level of relative skills during self-suﬃciency:
˜
˜ =
µ

¶ 1
1−
(11)
From (6), we can infer that ˜˜  1  ˜˜, i.e. at the -
location, the steady-state level of skills in the production of -goods will be
higher than skills in producing -goods, whereas the reverse will be true at
-locations. If we further compare human capital levels within the same
activity across locations at some point in time, we can e.g. calculate the
state-state level for ˜˜:
˜
˜ =
µ 

( + )
( + )
¶ 1
1−  1 (12)
Analogously, it is easily shown that ˜˜  1.10 Thus it is intuitively
clear that the potential benefits of specialization and trade between loca-
tions will grow as a non-trading economy approaches its steady-state level
of human capital.
10A short proof of the result in (12): ˜˜  1 if  ( + )   ( + ),
where we exploit the fact that  =  and that  = . After rearranging and
cancelling terms, this inequality is only valid if    holds, which we indeed know is
true by definition from (5).
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3.5 Optimization in a market economy
In this section attention will be restricted to the regime where trade takes
place, and where people specialize in production in accordance with their
comparative advantages. That is, as a result of the diﬀerent paths of skill
formation described in the section above, individuals at -locations might
eventually find it beneficial to specialize in the production of -goods, while
individuals at -sites specialize in production of -goods.
While preferences of individuals are the same as under self-suﬃciency,
the budget constraints are diﬀerent. For individuals at location  = , total
income, , is divided between consumption of - and -goods:
 =  +  (13)
where  is the price of agricultural goods measured in terms of manufactured
goods. Income of -people derive from spending the entire time endowment
on production of m-goods so that  = 1. This means that total income
is
 =  =  (14)
For people living in −locations the corresponding constraints are
 =  + 
 =  = 
Solving the utility maximization problem of individuals at the two locations
leads to the following demand equations for the two products:
 = +    =

 (+ )  for  =  (15)
In a competitive equilibrium relative supply equals relative demand, and
the price adjusts so as to clear markets:

 =

+ [ + ]
1 + [ + ]
where  is total income of individuals of the -type,  the income
of the -people taken together.
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After some rearrangements we get the equilibrium price
∗ = 

  (16)
The relative level of skills under specialization is  = 1 since individ-
ual () spend her entire time endowment on the production of -goods
and -goods, respectively. This ensures that the equilibrium relative price
will remain constant over time. It also shows that the price for agricul-
tural goods produced by -type people will increase with  since a higher
 means a corresponding lower level of  (since  =  − ) which
decreases the production of agricultural goods and increases the price.
Using (15) and (16), we can solve for the indirect levels of utility in the
market economy:
 =  () ()
µ

¶
(17)
 =  () ()
µ

¶−
 (18)
From these expressions, it is immediately clear that the utility of people
in region  will be directly dependent on the human capital and resource
levels of their own region as well as on the corresponding levels of the other
region. This is the primary vehicle behind the emergence of a more cohesive
political climate, as described below.
3.6 Bargaining outcomes
As mentioned above, the political “struggle” takes place in the second stage
over the allocation of the resource  =  +.
3.6.1 Division of the resource under self-suﬃciency
The political process for dividing up the resource, which might be employed
during both self-suﬃciency and market economy, is peaceful bargaining. We
assume for simplicity that this scenario can be described by the following
asymmetrical Nash bargaining problem:
max
 = (  ) ( )1−   =  (19)
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In this expression,   represents the indirect utility levels in regime  = 
for type  = , that were derived above and where  is the (exogenous)
relative bargaining power of the -group
In general, this formalization should be regarded as a metaphor for some-
thing more general. The objective of any political player is (at least in part)
to obtain gains for his or her supporters. Sometimes political decisions rep-
resent Pareto improvements, but just as often it holds that “one group’s
gain is another’s loss”. While gains and losses in general are not necessarily
symmetrical, the simple formalization of a Nash bargain over a scarce re-
source captures the flavor of non-violent political struggle, the outcome of
which aﬀects the income and productivity of the citizens of society.
The two opposing political “parties” will be (representatives from) the
two diﬀerent groups living in society: -types and -types. In a regime
characterized by the absence of trade between groups we may think about
political groups being organized around locations. In a fully developed mar-
ket economy, location will also say something about occupation, due to the
process of skill formation and derived comparative advantages in produc-
tion, which is specific to individual locations. But the fundamental division
of the population into distinct political groups can be regarded as the same
across regimes, just as the decision making process itself.
The solution to the maximization problem above leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 1: (No political cohesion). The bargaining solution under
self-suﬃciency is ∗ =  ∗ = (1− ). The bargaining power of
the political groups determine allocations.
Proof: The bargaining problem under self-suﬃciency is to find
∗ = argmax =
h
Ω (−)
i hΩi1−
where the terms inside the brackets (when multiplied by the bunch of
parameters Ω) are the indirect utilities derived above. The usual steps
leads to the solution stated above.
Hence, the division of the resource will simply reflect the relative polit-
ical power of the two groups. In the event one group were to become “all
powerful”, nothing rules out a solution where it takes most of the resource
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for itself, leaving the other group to starvation. In this sense the political
struggle is non-cohesive as the two individual fractions of society simply at-
tempt to grab as large a fraction of the resource as possible for their own
benefit.
3.6.2 Division of the resource in the market economy
After substituting for the indirect utility levels of the two groups from (17)
and (18) into the Nash bargaining function, it follows that the bargaining
problem in a market economy becomes that of finding
 = argmax = Ψ (−)
where Ψ ≡ 1−
³ ´− 
In the same manner as above, we obtain the following key result:
Proposition 2: (Political Cohesion). The bargaining solution in the
market economy is ∗ =  ∗ =  The solution is unanimously
agreed upon by the individual groups of society.
Proof: Straightforward diﬀerentiation of the Nash product above yields
the results.
Hence, in the market regime the division of power ceases to be relevant
for the solution to the bargaining problem. In eﬀect, the result is equivalent
to choosing an allocation for  which maximizes the sum of the utility for the
two groups. In other words, the outcome from the bargaining process will be
unanimously agreed upon and Pareto optimal. The intuition for this result
is simple. The productivity of the two types become linked, via the market
mechanism. Seen from the perspective of, say, the -type, the productivity of
the -type becomes important, since this determines the price -individuals
have to pay for manufactured goods. Likewise, individuals at −sites will
worry about the price of agricultural goods, and therefore, the productivity
of -types. This state of aﬀairs leads to a commonly agreed upon outcome
of the political process - i.e. capitalist cohesion - in the market regime.
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3.7 Choice of regime
In this section, we reach finally the first stage of the model: The decision
what economic regime to be in. In this decision, the agents take into account
all the results derived in the previous sections.
In periods of self-suﬃciency, agents in the two regions consider the option
of starting to trade with each other. However, a transition to a market
economy is inevitably associated with transaction costs. Goods need to
be physically moved to the market place, a monetary system of exchange
might be necessary, and common standards need to be agreed upon, to
mention a few examples (North, 1991). The transaction costs for setting up
a common market also depends on geography, as emphasized by Gallup et al
(1998). In a broader interpretation, one may think of the transaction costs
as also depending on how secure private property rights are. If theft and
expropriation of revenue is widespread this would add to the transaction
costs as some kind of protection against such occurrences would need to be
bought by the market participant.11 Finally, the costs of trading could also
be influenced by animosities between groups, which produces a “psychic”
utility cost of interacting. To capture costs such as these in a simple way
it is assumed that households need to pay a fixed cost,   1, in the event
they start trading.
The utility comparison that people in the -region make is

  = Λ ·


µ

¶ µ

¶
(20)
where Λ = 
³
1 + 
´ ³
1 + 
´  0 whereas the equivalent
calculation of the net gain of entering a market economy for individuals in
region  is

  = Λ ·

(1− )
µ 

¶µ 

¶
 (21)
Finally, in the presence of transaction costs  we require that the fol-
lowing inequalities are fulfilled if a transition to a market economy is to
11Grossman and Kim (1995) model such “defensive” and “oﬀensive” expenditures ex-
plicitly. Oﬀensive expenditures relate to costs associated with expropriating funds from
other individuals. They show that under certain circumstances individuals will refrain
from investing in “oﬀensive" measures, thus motivating scenarios where property rights
are secure.
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occur
 : 

   ;  :

    (22)
The interpretation of these conditions is straightforward. Consider for
instance the -type. First, a transition becomes more likely if  is large.
This ratio reflects the gains from specialization in that it relates the pro-
ductivity of an -type in producing  goods (), to the productivity of
the type that owns a comparative advantage in producing  goods (). As
knowledge of how to best produce  goods grows more rapidly at -locations
than at -locations, we showed above that  will rise over time towards
a steady-state level. Given that this level is large enough, the growing ratio
will eventually persuade -people to participate in the market.
Second, consider the term involving  In the present model the
ratio  is constant and dictated by the initial distribution of the pop-
ulation, since population levels are fixed. Nevertheless, the individuals in
group  will find the market economy more attractive if  is large relative
to . This is a supply eﬀect. More “ people" means a greater supply of
the  good (relative to the  good), thus implying a lower relative price of
the good that the -type is purchasing in the market economy.
Third, the ratio  (1− ) represents a political eﬀect. In autarky, type
 individuals’ bargaining power is . So the gains for -people from shifting
into the market economy are higher the more powerful the other group is.
Furthermore, we may observe that the likelihood of a transition to a market
economy increases when  approaches 1/2, i.e. when initial political power
is relatively equally distributed. Should  approach 0 or 1, one of the groups
will always object to the transition and it will thus not occur.12
Finally, higher transaction costs  makes it less likely that any individual
will engage in trade.
The condition for the individuals of group  can be interpreted in a
similar manner. As goes for -individuals, it is likely that individuals in
the  group will eventually support a transition to a market economy, and
start participating in trade, since  grows faster than . However, a
requirement for this to happen is that the steady-state levels ˜˜ and
˜˜ are high enough.13
12See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) for a related discussion of how income inequality,
manifested in political inequality, aﬀects the likelihood of a transition to democracy.
13Formally, for -types, we can deduce from (12), (21), and (22) that a transition
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4 Discussion
Under the model the following evolution of an economy can be envisioned.
Initially, the population is randomly distributed across a geographical area,
after which an era of self-suﬃciency commences. During this time the out-
come from political interaction between geographically divided groups in
society will be non-cohesive in nature, as groups try to grab as large a pro-
portion of the resources that they possibly can to the limits of their political
power and influence.
Slowly, however, due to task-specific learning, the gains from special-
ization rises. Eventually these gains are suﬃciently large so as to entice
even a very powerful group to commence trade with their political oppo-
nents. As a result, economic interdependence between groups arises via the
price mechanism. This change transforms the nature of the political strug-
gle, since it is no longer in the interest of a previously powerful group to
provide its opponents with less than their “due share” of the economy’s re-
source. Lower productivity of one group leads to higher prices of goods both
groups consume. As a result, the optimal choice for both political groups
will be to reach a compromise - i.e. the Pareto optimal allocation of the
resource - which maximizes aggregate output. Moreover, this allocation is
unanimously agreed upon; a sense of political cohesion has emerged and,
moreover, prosperity increases.
A transition to a market economy is only inevitable if the gains from
specialization increase to a suﬃcient extent. Even in this case, however, the
timing of a transition will be aﬀected by structural charactaristics of individ-
ual economies like transaction costs and the political division of power. But
once the economy has transited into a market regime, the political outcome
is Pareto optimal. Consequently output rises due to this fact alone, but also
because the market allows individuals to exploit comparative advantages.
Hence there is a bi-directional link between aﬄuence and political cohesion.
While cohesion and prosperity thus should be positively correlated it is
worth observing that the link could be violated in a cross-country context.
To illustrate; consider two diﬀerent economies, where one is richer than
to a market economy will only evolve endogenously if ˜˜ =


(+)
(+)
 1
1− 

(1−)
Λ

 If this condition is not met, perhaps because the gains from specialization
are not suﬃciently large, the economy will be stuck in a non-trading regime.
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the other. This diﬀerence in productive capabilities may not necessarily be
trade induced. Indeed, one economy could be relatively richer because of
a larger supply of resources (). Since the “market transition” depends
on the size of relative levels of productivity across individuals, not absolute
levels of the same, the rich economy could be in a “no-trade” regime, while
the poorer economy of the two could be organized as a market economy
with full specialization. While this example perhaps is too contrived to be
regarded as the “likely” configuration of prosperity and cohesion, it serves
to highlight an important point: Merely raising the income of an economy
(say by infusing foreign aid) will not lead to a more cohesive political climate
unless this increase of productivity is associated with a intensified exchange
of goods between citizens of society.
Could there be a reversal from a capitalist market economy back to sulf-
suﬃciency in our model, perhaps due to an exogenous shock? Since trading
requires a consent by both regions, a reversal to self-suﬃciency happens if
one of the regions opts out of the market economy. This is not a likely
scenario in our simplified model since specialization will drive  and 
to zero so that people forget how to produce anything else than the good they
have specialized in. In this sense, people in the capitalist economy will have
"burned their bridges" back to a non-specialized structure of production.
In reality, of course, the sector without a comparative advantage usually
does not disintegrate completely in a market economy. Suppose that for
some reason we have that    0 always holds so that it is not com-
pletely impossible to return to self-suﬃciency. The expressions in (21) and
(20) then suggest some shocks that possibly could cause a collapse of the
market economy. If, for instance, the population ratio  fell - perhaps
due to disease, mass starvation, or emigration from the -region - the price
of -goods would rise due to the fall in supply. From (21), we see that if this
change was large enough then -people might be induced to switch back
to self-suﬃciency.
Finally, it is worth stressing that we do not claim that conflicts never
happen in capitalist societies. In the terminology of Collier and Hoeﬄer
(2004), conflicts may arise due to "greed" as well as being a consequence of
"grievances" between groups. The latter motive may be highly persistent,
reflecting perhaps religious and ethno-linguistic diﬀerences. There is no
reason to expect that market integration would remove the risk of conflict
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if primarily caused by such societal divides. We do expect, however, that
conflicts spawned by the greed motive should become less pervasive once
extensive trading relations between citizens have been established.
5 Concluding Remarks
The present paper has developed the hypothesis that economic interaction
between agents, the exchange of goods, is crucial for the nature of political
outcomes. In particular it describes a possible trajectory along which an
economy may travel in the course of development which eventually takes
it into a regime where political cohesion prevail. The implied link between
income and political cohesion is broadly consistent with both modern day
evidence on aﬄuence and stability, as well as the historical record of current
day developed economies.
The model is, needless to say, highly stylized. For example, it only
allows for two rival political groups. In principle the framework could be
generalized to the case of  groups (politically engaged in generalized Nash
bargaining) with individually specific comparative advantages. Potentially
this would allow for regimes involving partial specialization (some groups are
trading, others are not), thus capturing a more gradual process of market
integration. At the same time the model would become complex to the
point of being intractable, given the large set of viable economic equilibrium
outcomes in a “world” involving trade in  goods.
The basic idea forwarded in the present paper could be applied to other
areas of interest. A line of inquiry where the logic of the model might ap-
ply is the sustainability of democracy. One might conjecture that in order
for democracy to persist certain amounts of political cohesion between ri-
val political parties is required. In the absence of a fully developed market
economy, democratic institutions may allow a majority to treat a minority
“unfairly”, leading the latter to nurse a grievance. Conversely, if political
fractions are economically integrated, political cohesion arises, leading to
policy choices with broad public support, thus making democratic institu-
tions relatively uncontroversial from the perspective of individual citizens
of society. While economic integration allows for higher income per capita,
as gains from specialization are exploited, the key driving force behind co-
hesion is the interdependence of individuals via the market. Income does
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not matter per se, in contrast to the so-called “modernization hypothesis”
(Lipset, 1959). Perhaps it was not a coincidence that democratic institu-
tions spread across Western Europe following the industrious revolution?
Our model might serve as a basic framework for further research in this
area.
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A Figure and Table
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Figure 1: The figure shows the correlation between log GDP per capita and po-
litical cohesion, as described in the text. The latter variable is measured over the
period 1981-2000, whereas GDP per capita is measured in 1990. 71 countries are
represented in the figure. Notes: (a) The correlation between the two variables is
0.67, and significant at 1%. (b) The illustrated line is estimated by OLS; see Table
1, column 1 for details.
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Table 1. Determinants of Political Cohesion 
Dependent variable: Political Cohesion 
GDP pc    8.50a 
(1.56) 
  8.47a 
(2.11) 
9.58a 
(2.11) 
8.45a
(1.99) 
  4.63c 
 (2.41) 
 5.82b 
 (2.47) 
7.76a 
(2.19) 
9.35a 
 (2.31) 
5.55a 
(2.03) 
Ethnic      7.10 
(5.99) 
          ‐0.40 
(3.89) 
Population        ‐0.05 
  (.60) 
        ‐0.34 
 (0.56) 
Population1564          0.86b 
(.36) 
        0.72c 
(0.38) 
Unemployment               ‐0.50c
   (.26) 
    ‐0.16 
(.15) 
Urbanization               0.04 
 (.09) 
  ‐0.07 
(0.09) 
Primary school                0.16 
 (.15) 
0.29b
(0.11) 
Continent fixed 
effects 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  71  71  70  71  71  48  71  66  46 
R2  0.48  0.51  0.57  0.51  0.55  0.49  0.51  0.65  0.80 
Notes: (1) a, b and c denotes, respectively, significance at 1,5 and 10%. (2) Robust standard errors in 
paranthesis, (3) All regressions contain a constant. (4) All regressions estimated by OLS. 
 
